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GENETIC ENGINEERING FOR THE ENVIRONMENT: ETHICAL 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE BIOTECHNOLOGY REVOLUTION 
 
 
CELIA E. DEANE-DRUMMOND  
Chester College of Higher Education 
 
 
The ethics of genetic engineering, or genethics in current jargon, is one of those areas of 
debate which needs to be constantly reviewed in the light of the rapidly expanding science 
of biotechnology. It could be argued that the revolution taking place within biology will be 
as significant to our existence as Newton's and Einstein's ideas were for physics. The 
concept of manipulation of human genes has led to considerable public debate and 
discussion amongst moral philosophers and theologians.(1) I intend, in this article, to 
concentrate on the relatively neglected area of genetic engineering as used for agricultural 
purposes, with particular reference to crop plants. The philosophical, theological and 
ethical implications of this application of biology are rather different from those pertaining 
to human beings and deserve separate attention. In particular, this technology has 
important environmental consequences, both in the short-term and the long-term. The 
possible long-term effects on the human community is equally significant, both directly in 
terms of North/South relationships and indirectly through environmental influences. These 
potential effects need to be considered a priori if theology/philosophy is to have any real 
bearing on future policy decisions. 
 
The tendency amongst theologians and philosophers is to adopt what William Temple 
described as a ‘middle axiom’ approach when reflecting theologically on social issues.(2) 
This is the establishment of broad theological principles, while at the same time resisting 
any attempt to make detailed recommendations. In some ways this seems to be a valid 
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approach since there are relatively few theologians and philosophers who are equipped to 
understand the detailed knowledge of science that is needed in order to make a realistic 
contribution to scientific practice. The philosopher Stephen Clark opts for a similar position 
in his recent book, How to Think About the Earth.(3) This book achieves its aim to be a 
serious overview and critique of the larger claims made by preachers, lobbyists and 
politicians.(4) The specific ethical dilemmas faced by environmental scientists are not 
included in his discussion. lan Barbour's latest volume Ethics in an Age of Technology 
outlines the basic science of genetic engineering.(5) However, the philosophical and 
theological implications are more generally related to technology, rather than the specific 
issues associated with genetic engineering. My purpose here is to look at three different 
attitudes to genetic engineering that are most common, using particular case studies as 
illustrations. I will then offer a philosophical critique in the light of real decisions faced by 
both policy makers and scientists. Finally, I will indicate ways in which theological 
reflection can contribute to the ongoing discussion. My method, then, is 'from below', 
drawing on particular examples which are environmentally significant as a basis for 
reflection. This mirrors, in part, my own experience of biologist first, followed by theologian. 
To some extent I am assuming at the outset certain theological principles as given, such 
as the belief in the goodness of God as Creator and the idea of humankind made in the 
image of God.(6) 
 
GENETIC ENGINEERING AS PROMISE 
The green revolution is the cultural and scientific soil out of which grew an optimistic 
attitude to genetic engineering as applied to agriculture. In the late 1960s traditional plant 
breeding methods were used by scientists to develop high-yield seeds. When this was 
combined with more intensive use of fertilizer there were vast increases in production, 
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especially in Third World countries. In India, for example, the wheat crop was doubled in 
six years.(7) However, the dream that the green revolution could solve the world food 
crisis came up against unexpected difficulties. Small farmers and the rural communities 
were ousted by wealthier landowners who could afford the costly fertilizers. In addition, the 
mechanized form of farming reduced the need for human labour and thus, ironically, in-
creased overall poverty and deprivation. While India has now become a food exporter, the 
poor still cannot afford the food they need for survival.(8)  
 
More recently there has been a drive for the development of crops which require less 
fertilizers as well as the introduction of appropriate technology that requires less fuel.(9) 
Much of the task of genetic engineering has been no more than to complement that of 
traditional breeding methods. However, instead of taking several years to develop a new 
crop, it now takes a matter of months. In this respect genetic engineering could be seen as 
a liberation from time constraints imposed by slow growing crops. In a hungry world few 
would wish to legislate against the development of crops that could flourish in the poorer 
areas of the world hampered by dry, salty or nutritionally poor conditions. However, while 
the green revolution was directed towards the needs of the Third World, genetic 
engineering is more often conducted in the West under industrial contracts requiring 
patents for new varieties.(10) The promise of genetic engineering seems, then, to be 
directed towards the needs of high income populations such as prescription drugs, or 
crops grown for the Western market, where the profits are high. 
 
GENETIC ENGINEERING AS POWER 
A specific example of the distribution of research to date is that more money has been 
spent on the development of strawberries that can withstand frost conditions for the spring 
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USA market than on the improvement of basic subsistence crops, such as cassava, 
beans, or maize grown in the Third World.(11) Other rapidly expanding technologies 
include the development of tissue cultures grown in laboratory conditions that have been 
engineered to produce 'synthetic' products. It may be a matter of time before a 
biotechnological means is found to produce substitutes for substances such as vanilla or 
cocoa. If this were to take place we would witness a collapse in the economy of 
Madagascar, which relies on vanilla bean exports, and the economy of West Africa, which 
relies on cocoa. Biotechnology is becoming a means of oppressing Third World economies 
and seems to drive a deeper wedge between rich and poor nations. It is these long term 
social consequences of genetic engineering which need careful consideration. While there 
is legislation in place, at least in principle, to protect the environment from the possible 
health risks of genetic engineering, it becomes much harder to legislate towards research 
priorities. The market economy seems too crude an instrument to act in a way which 
protects the interests of all concerned. The promise of genetic engineering is becoming, 
instead, a means for making profit in a way that allows further domination of the poorer 
Southern nations by the richer Northern ones. 
 
There is another sense in which genetic engineering can be seen as a power, and that is 
human power and domination of the natural world. It is now possible, for example, to 
engineer genetically bovine growth hormone (BST) in laboratory conditions. If this is 
injected into cows this increases the production of milk by 15/20%. The idea that cows and 
other farm animals can be manipulated in this way for human benefit alone encourages 
human perception of animals as resources to be managed.(12) Other even more insidious 
developments include research into production of animals that can withstand their 
overcrowded conditions. Although conventional breeding is used in this case to achieve 
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this aim, it may be a matter of time before it could be achieved using genetic engineering. 
In this case it represents the loss of a particular capacity, which is easier to achieve by 
genetic engineering compared with the addition of a positive attribute. This is related to the 
fact that deletion of sections of genetic material is easier than unravelling the regulation of 
a complex battery of genes that are required for certain character attributes. In most cases 
such deletion is likely to be lethal and thus unusable or produce other unwanted side-
effects. However, the attempt to direct research in this direction exemplifies the bland 
assumption that the animal is little more than a mechanism. The aim is to produce an 
animal that is a passive 'vegetable' in intensive conditions, which amounts to loss in quality 
of life. 
 
GENETIC ENGINEERING AS THREAT 
The genetic engineering of animals in the manner described above could be seen as a 
potential threat to animal welfare for the sake of human interests. However, the fear of 
genetic engineering in the public mind is usually associated with a perception of either the 
risk of genetic engineering per se, or the threat to authentic human existence. 
 
The environment risk factors associated with genetic engineering are related to the power 
of the technology to bring about irreversible change in the hereditary material of plants and 
animals. For example, it is now possible to engineer genetically crop plants that are 
resistant to chemical herbicides. Recently, a government advisory committee has given a 
Belgian company permission to release a genetically engineered rapeseed that contains 
resistance to the herbicide 'Basta'.(13) This, in theory, allows farmers to control weeds in 
rapeseed fields that are normally also susceptible to the herbicide. There were no public 
consultations prior to the decision by the committee. In this case the risk factors will be 
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enhanced because the environmental consequences will not be monitored adequately by 
a company determined to market the product. The company denies that there is any risk to 
the environment. However, while there have been over sixty small-scale releases of 
genetically engineered organisms in Britain, there has only been one scientific study of the 
environmental consequences. It is not proven that this new rapeseed will be benign in an 
environmental sense. If anything, the science suggests the opposite since rapeseed can 
cross-fertilize with wild mustard plants and even become a weed in roadside verges. Once 
these genetically engineered plants are established they would be difficult to control as 
they would be herbicide resistant. 
 
There are other more indirect risks in this instance. The very development of herbicide-
resistant crop plants encourages herbicide use, which is in itself a threat to the natural 
ecosystem. Government regulations rarely consider indirect risks of this type. Furthermore, 
the increased dependence of the farmers on herbicides for weed control encourages an 
equal dependence on the hybrid seed sold by the same company as a package. Hybrid 
seeds do not breed true in the next generation, which means that for a uniform crop the 
farmer relies on new seed purchased every year, instead of more traditional methods of 
saving seed from the crop the year before.(14) 
 
Another indirect risk, which is also characteristic of conventional plant breeding, is the 
overall reduction in genetic diversity. However, in the case of genetically engineered plants 
this uniformity can be transferred to other species as well through transgenic 
manipulations, that is, genetic transfer to another species. A Dutch company is presently 
testing the herbicide resistance system developed originally for rapeseed, discussed 
above, for chicory plants. Crops which grow from wild strains have a much greater 
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variability which protects them from pests and disease. When a crop is genetically 
engineered the resultant uniformity brings the desired increase in yield, but also carries a 
greater risk of vulnerability to disease. Much of the classic plant breeding was directed 
towards keeping 'one step ahead' of the rapidly changing populations of virulent fungi and 
other pests. While the genetic engineering of plants can speed up this search for resistant 
crops, it eventually leads to a loss of variability available for potential change. This loss of 
natural variability within one species is irreversible. In order to find sources of variation 
researchers have sought wild strains which have retained their genetic variability and 
which still grow in poorer Southern continents. The need for foreign investments means 
that in many cases the patent for these seeds does not reflect the potential benefit for 
Northern markets.(15) The threat of genetic engineering in this case has become another 
occasion for the abuse of power. 
 
There are other examples which show how biotechnology can become a threat to genuine 
human existence. The traditional close relationship between the farmer and his land 
seems to be replaced by a transference of power to seed companies, as exemplified by 
the following. In 1992 a biotechnology subsidiary of WR Grace (USA), called Agracetus, 
was given the patent on all genetically engineered cotton plants.(16) The patent covers 
any genetically engineered cotton species, which gives the company a monopoly on all 
newly developed strains. Agracetus can charge royalties to any company or scientist 
intending to engineer cotton genetically. Farmers also have to pay royalties if they grow 
these plants selected for high yields. In effect the company has a monopoly on cotton 
growing. Even the biotechnology industry regarded this as an unfortunate anomaly. Yet 
the European patent office has recently repeated this mistake in giving Agracetus a patent 
on all genetically engineered soya plants. Those most likely to suffer are the Third World 
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farmers who cannot afford to pay the licence fees. The Rural Advancement Fund 
(International) helps countries in the Third World to monitor developments in 
biotechnology. It has declared its intention to challenge the soya patent through legal 
means. 
 
The potential threat of genetic engineering seems to have been anticipated by Pope John 
Paul II, who said in an address to UNESCO: 
 
The Future of man and mankind is threatened, radically threatened, in spite of very 
noble intentions, by men of science ... their discoveries have been and continue to 
be exploited - to the prejudice of ethical imperatives - to ends of destruction and 
death to a degree never before attained, causing unimaginable ravages ... This can 
be verified as well in the realm of genetic manipulations and biological experiments 
as well as in those of chemical, bacteriological or nuclear armaments.(17) 
 
 
While his direct accusation of scientists alone seems a little misplaced, it is true that the 
potential abuse of the power of genetic engineering represents an enormous threat to 
human survival and quality of life. Adequate restraints and controls cannot, therefore, be 
left purely to government commissions. 
 
A PHILOSOPHICAL CRITIQUE 
The French philosopher and social critic Jacques Ellul describes technology as an 
autonomous and uncontrollable force which pervades social, economic and political 
life.(18) This leads to an enslavement to all that the technology demands. If we extend this 
idea to genetic engineering then the very fabric of life becomes subject to a form of 
determinism. At the opposite extreme, it is possible to portray technology as a liberator, a 
product of human choices. Samuel Florman is an engineer who argues that the life of 
earlier centuries has been over-romanticized.(19) He believes that the undesirable effects 
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of technology can be overcome by more technology. One example of this would be the 
use of genetic engineering to overcome the problem of crop sensitivity to herbicides. 
 
The extent to which we perceive genetic engineering as a threat or a promise reflects a 
wider human dualism in our own perceptions. On the one hand we are actively involved in 
our individual schemes and projects, while on the other hand we can stand apart from 
these and adopt a more holistic perspective.(20) The beneficial effects of genetic 
engineering in the development of new medicines and the protection of animals and plants 
and in some cases humans against disease is often cited by genetic engineers to justify 
their work and achievements. This view is unashamedly anthropocentric in putting human 
interests first and using genetic engineering as a means for perceived human 
advancement. On the other hand, the wider impacts of some of these developments and 
the very idea of interfering with hereditary material in an irreversible way gives rise to a 
genuine concern that genetic engineering is to the detriment of life and the planet as a 
whole.(21) Those who insist that the interests of all life forms are to be given moral worth 
are often called ‘biocentric’.(22) This is related to current scientific method. A reductionist 
methodology in science analyses the separate components as a way of understanding life. 
Genetic engineering is necessarily the fruit of this reductionist approach. An alternative is 
to examine the totality of interrelationships and ecosystems, which leads to a form of 
holism. This radically different approach even within the biological sciences leads to 
conflict between genetic engineers and ecologists as to the goals of their research. It 
seems to me that this mirrors the ambiguity felt by the wider public in relation to the value 
of genetic engineering. 
 
It might be possible to argue against any genetic engineering as being somehow 
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unnatural. However, it is important here to distinguish between the use of genetic 
engineering to speed up what would be possible by normal breeding methods and its use 
in transgenic experiments. There are those who object to genetic engineering on the basis 
that it is an invasion of biological integrity. However, according to biologists’ understanding 
of evolution, biological integrity as such does not exist. As a consequence we share many 
of the same biological and physiological processes as other life forms. Furthermore, the 
ability of breeders and farmers to bring about change over a relatively short time span 
became part of the evidence for Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution.(23) It seems 
questionable whether natural selection is any more altruistic for the species than artificial 
breeding or genetic engineering. It seems to me that the philosophical basis for regulation 
and constraints in genetic engineering needs to be sought in avenues other than a vague 
notion of biological integrity. I will return to this point again below. 
 
In all breeding methods there is a tendency to treat animals and plants as commodities. 
Genetic engineering allows, then, an even greater detachment from the animal or plant in 
such a way that they can become highly vulnerable to exploitation. Heidegger rejects the 
idea that technology is neutral and is simply a means to an end.(24) He suggests that 
modern technology has failed to bring forth what is the original intention of the natural 
environment. Instead technology is confrontational and challenging. As such this is an 
unreasonable demand placed on nature. Heidegger argues that this attitude in technology 
was prior to the modern physics of the seventeenth century - and, I would add, prior to the 
modern biology of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. He believes that the greatest 
illusion for humans is to see everything as their own construction, since it drives out other 
forms of revealing from within the natural world. Heidegger did not totally reject 
technology, but was actually aware of its ambiguities for a genuine human existence. The 
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same could be said for the biotechnology revolution of contemporary Western culture. 
 
Paul Taylor has suggested that respect for nature is a key paradigm in the development of 
a theory of environmental ethics.(25) By ‘nature’ he seems to mean the human as well as 
the non-human species, so his theory could be translated into the idea of the respect for 
life. In this way we are all part of a simple biotic community, a theme taken up and dev-
eloped by other philosophers such as Baird Callicott.(26) The key question is whether the 
recognition of a relationship of mutual dependence constitutes a moral relationship as well. 
Robin Attfield argues against the idea that interdependence strengthens moral 
relationships, preferring the notion that all species who have interests have moral 
standing.(27) We could ask: What does it mean for a species to have interests? This 
seems to be related to the idea of what constitutes respect. Kant believed that if we treat 
people as a means to our own ends and do not recognize their ends, we are failing to 
show respect.(28) Genetic engineering has to treat living things in a mechanistic way in 
order to achieve its goals. However, there is a distinction between treating living things 
purely as a means for our ends, disregarding that creature’s ends, and bringing our 
interests in line with that of the creature. This echoes the idea of Heidegger that we 
become sensitive to the revealing within the natural world. However, it still requires human 
judgement and a form of empathy to decide exactly what the interests of the creature 
mean in practice. There seems to be no need, then, to reject genetic engineering in 
principle, as long as we take into account the interests of the creatures concerned. In the 
case studies cited above the deliberate manipulation of animal hereditary material as a 
means of rendering the animal more passive in crowded conditions seems an 
unacceptable violation of that creature's interests. 
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It seems to me that while the idea of respect for life and the interests of creatures as a 
philosophical basis for ethics can take us some way towards working out priorities in 
genetic engineering, if we focus just on the immediate interests of the creature we can all 
too easily fail to look at the wider social and environmental consequences. I would also 
add that we need to take into account the long-term interests of the environment as a 
whole as well as the interests of the whole human community. For example, if we take the 
case of herbicide resistance introduced by genetic engineering there seems to be no 
evidence that this causes immediate harm to the species involved. If anything, the crop will 
benefit by carrying genes for herbicide resistance, as it survives in the presence of this 
chemical. None the less, as I showed above, the potential effects on the ecosystem and 
the farming community could be catastrophic. In this case the interest in profit seems to be 
higher than the respect for the wider community. Holmes Rolston III has argued for the 
idea of ‘systemic value’ as a way of taking into account the worth of the whole 
ecosystem.(29) This could possibly be a useful concept as applied in the case mentioned 
above. However, the idea needs some qualification as it can lead to an over-romanticized 
view of the biological integrity of the whole system, a point I alluded to above. The actual 
biological stability of ecosystems is a highly debatable topic in ecology. Ecosystems 
emerge in a more random way than is implied by some ‘deep green’ philosophers. Having 
said this, there is no guarantee that the new ecosystem that would develop after human 
interference would be either desirable or controllable. I will return to this point again below. 
It is ironical, perhaps, that genetic engineering, which seeks to assert human power over 
the natural environment, can lead to situations which could, potentially, be uncontrollable. 
The Utopian vision of a custom-made world is supposed to lead to a fully controlled 
environment for human habitation. Charges of sentimentality abound, both against genetic 
engineers who have such a vision, and, in return, against the animal liberationists. A 
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pioneer in the latter group is Tom Regan who believes that the aims of animal rights 
activists should be towards the abolition of commercial agriculture and the use of animals 
in science.(30) This would, in effect, amount to a moratorium on genetic engineering, at 
least as applied to animals. 
 
The philosopher A.A. Brennan has argued that one of the main problems in making 
decisions about environmental problems is our lack of honesty: ‘It is neither unfair nor 
unkind to governments, public agencies and corporations to observe that we are a long 
way from full honesty in our debates and deliberations on the environment.’(31) He insists 
that this dishonesty is encouraged by the public acceptance of a shallow analysis of 
science and mythic portrayals of our situation, both of which encourage ‘self-deception’ 
and ‘incontinence’. The first myth he highlights is that of restoring nature, after human 
interventions such as mining, industrialization, etc. There is a strong belief that, given the 
right technology, we can restore nature to the original condition. I could add here the myth 
of improving nature as applied to genetic engineering. A good example would be the 
attempt by scientists, so far unsuccessful, to transfer nitrogen-fixing genes from legumes, 
such as clover and peas, to cereal plants such as wheat. Such a transgenic experiment 
promises to improve nature by giving wheat plants the potential to fix gaseous nitrogen so 
that they would be less dependent on artificial fertilizers.(32) 
 
In the ‘natural’ state legumes fix nitrogen by relying on a bacterium which occupies its host 
plant in special swollen parts of the roots called nodules. Although the project sounds 
altruistic and environmentally friendly, the dishonesty lies in a failure to point out 
physiological and ecological features. Firstly, even legumes rely on artificial fertilizers to 
increase yields, so that it is by no means certain that such manipulation would reduce 
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fertilizer use sufficiently to reduce environmental damage. More important perhaps, 
secondly, the technique involves modifying the bacterium/host relationship in such a way 
that the bacterium is no longer host specific. There seems to be no guarantee that such a 
relationship would be stable in field conditions, raising the spectre of the release of 
modified bacteria into the environment. The dishonesty lies in a failure to recognize that 
the project is not as environmentally friendly as it appears. More often such projects are 
given an environmental gloss as a way of appropriating funds for the patent on the 
modified seeds, or, more simply, as a way of enhancing the publication record of an 
institution as a means of gaining greater power and influence in a particular area of 
research. 
 
Brennan also asks the question as to whether the restoration of the natural environment 
after industrialization would give the Northern continents more authority in demanding that 
Southern countries preserve their tropical rainforests. However, it is biologically naïve to 
assume even in the forests of the North that any real restoration to the original diversity is 
possible. In the tropics the rate of elimination of species is so high that all talk of future 
restoration is wishful thinking. Yet genetic engineers, predominantly in richer Northern 
nations, are relying on the Third World as a reserve for potential genetic variability. 
 
Another common myth is that of ‘wild’ nature. Holmes Rolston III has used this idea as a 
paradigm for his philosophy of environmental ethics.(33) Attached to this myth is the idea 
that all ‘wild’ ecosystems are both stable and diverse. While the characteristic of 
biodiversity is true for the tropical rainforest, it is not true for all other ecosystems. For ex-
ample, Horn has shown that in the New England woodland the sequence of succession is 
towards a reduction of biodiversity. Periodic fires and the impact of humans serve to 
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maintain the existing biodiversity.(34) I am not saying that the preservation of biodiversity 
is mistaken; rather, it cannot be supported by reference to ‘wild’ nature. I would also agree 
with Brennan when he points out that ‘It is striking, and unfortunate, that many 
conservationists still operate with ideas of balance and diversity in nature that were more 
prevalent in the nineteenth century than among contemporary ecologists.’(35) 
 
The myth of balance and biodiversity is important for ‘deep green’ philosophers as it 
seems to provide a biological basis for non-interference. However, absolute non-
interference is not really an option for humans, any more than any other species. It is the 
form of meddling that raises moral, aesthetic and policy issues. Furthermore, the biodiver-
sity of species mentioned in this context needs to be carefully distinguished from the 
natural variability in a given species that I mentioned above in relation to the classical plant 
breeding and the genetic engineering of cereals. This natural variability is an in-built 
mechanism for protection against disease. Once it is lost, the uniform nature of the crop 
means that susceptibility to disease is equally uniform and spreads through the whole 
crop. A further qualification to Brennan’s thesis is that the drastic loss of species caused 
by human interference in the tropical rainforests cannot be desirable. However, he is right 
in his belief that the basis for the maintenance of such diversity cannot be sought in forms 
of ‘naturalism’ which exalt a view of ‘nature’ which is out of touch with modern ecology. 
The protection of the interests of the species seems a more fruitful approach as long as it 
is set in the context of the interests of global ecology and issues of justice related to the 
human community. There are other arguments which could be brought to bear which 
overlap with theological perspectives, outlined below. 
 
To conclude this section: there seems to be no real philosophical basis for complete 
 16
abstinence towards genetic engineering as applied to agriculture. Rather, following 
Heidegger, it seems to me that we need to work towards the transformation of genetic 
engineering so that it comes to represent a more fully humane enterprise, in touch with the 
immediate and long-term effects.(36) 
 
THEOLOGICAL CRITIQUE 
William Frankena, in his analysis of the potential of theology for ethics, argues that while 
theology does have an ‘ethic’, it cannot answer all questions by itself.(37) The problems of 
interpretation and application still leave difficult decisions which cannot be answered by 
theology alone. The normative elements in biblical theology, such as the ten com-
mandments, may be a guide for living, but this is different from morality as such. For 
example, the sabbath day commandment is less a moral question than one of lifestyle. A 
more relevant contribution of theology perhaps, in the present context, is the way a 
theological perspective influences ethics. Frankena argues that logically ethics need not 
rest on theological presuppositions. However, the latter does show us what areas are 
particularly important to consider in ethics and provides both a rationality and motivation 
for ethics. Frankena’s position is intermediate between those who would argue that 
theology is impotent for ethics, in other words that ethics is autonomous, and those who 
use theology as a basis and foundation for ethics. 
 
The concept of autonomy in ethics seems to foster a broadly Kantian version of the 
division of labour for ethical decision making, where ethics becomes a disembodied 
autonomous subject legislating for itself on the basis of disengaged reason alone.(38) 
There is a tendency for this model to collapse into the idea that science alone can solve all 
environmental problems, since ethical value becomes objectified and unambiguous. An 
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example, in practice, of the way science has attempted to introduce a notion of value as 
part of its directives is the practice of cost-benefit and risk-benefit analysis. In this case the 
sum preferences of all individuals affected by a decision are taken into account in arriving 
at ‘ethical’ judgements.(39) The question remains: how ethical are such practices? 
 
It seems to me that any claim of autonomy on the part of ethics is naïve in its failure to 
recognize the complex cultural context, which includes a religious perspective. 
Furthermore, such an approach assumes, incorrectly, that all ethics would necessarily 
come to a univocal position in a way which ignores the concrete realities of ethical 
dilemmas. For McCormick the biblical story of faith becomes the ‘overarching foundation 
and criterion for morality’.(40) A Christian speaks out of the experience of this story, so 
that reasoning in ethics is informed by faith, and theology ‘yields a value-judgement and a 
general framework or attitude. It provides a framework for subsequent moral 
reasoning’.(41) McCormick insists that we truncate the task of theology if we see it as an 
action guide, rather than looking at wider issues such as the quality (good/bad) of the 
agent. This does not mean that all morally relevant insights are specifically Christian; 
rather, a Christian perspective confirms and critiques ethical practice. 
 
For theology to be true to its task it must include a reference to an ultimate power.(42) 
Gustafson describes this approach as theocentric ethics.(43) Religion is very often used 
for its utility in sustaining moral causes and purposes for which the deity becomes 
incidental. This is similar to the idea that values are incorporated into policy-making as a 
means to encourage particular social action. The rationale for this move is that the bare 
facts alone have failed to influence public opinion, so values, including religious ones, are 
introduced as a way of encouraging particular forms of behaviour.(44) The goals, then, are 
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set prior to any consideration of theology or ethics and values are introduced so as to act 
as a ‘social lubricant’. This form of social engineering represents an unacceptable use of 
the relationship between theology and ethics. As applied to genetic engineering it would 
imply that the goals are decided already and religious values which cohere with such goals 
are then promoted. 
 
If we take as a starting-point the critical social issues of the time, there is a temptation to 
put religion to the immediate needs of groups, societies and individuals. In this sense God 
becomes an instrument in the service of human beings. This is not the intention of this 
article. Rather, by beginning with some of the issues associated with genetic engineering 
in agriculture, the theological discussion becomes more rooted in concrete reality. The 
opposite danger, namely a theological discussion that never moves further than rarefied 
concepts of God, seems to me to be more prevalent amongst contemporary theologies of 
creation. The failure of science alone to come up with any effective answers to complex 
environmental issues is occasion enough to widen the debate to include other disciplines. 
This is especially true as applied to biotechnology where it is still possible for theologians, 
philosophers and ethicists to contribute to the shape of this rapidly expanding science. 
 
The question now is, how can the language about God help to shape the ethical directives 
in genetic engineering? For some religious believers the very idea of genetic engineering 
sounds like blasphemy. What right have humans to interfere with the natural world when it 
has been declared by God to be good? In answer to this question I refer to the above 
discussion about the interference of humans in ‘wild’ nature through cultivation of the land 
since the dawn of human existence. The questions are: What kind of interference is 
justified, given a belief in the goodness of creation? and What are the social and 
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environmental consequences? The current discussion about the morality of genetic 
engineering has focused almost exclusively on medical ethics and the human genome. 
Lehmann, for example, argues that we should suspend genetic engineering because it 
goes against the idea that ‘knowledge of life processes must be used to reinforce what is 
human in us’.(45) In other words, genetic engineering is somehow dehumanizing. 
According to biblical anthropology human beings are made in the ‘image of God’, so to 
interfere with human genetic material might seem to go against the special position of 
humans as made in the divine image. 
 
How far can we extend this idea of the divine image in order to apply a moratorium on the 
genetic engineering of animals and plants? The theological paradigm that seems relevant 
here is the experience of the Judaeo-Christian community of a God of love. The command 
of God in Genesis for humans to exercise dominion over creation is qualified by the 
essence of the relationship between Creator and creation as one of loving involvement. 
Creation becomes an expression of the love and glory of God. As Moltmann points out: 
 
The world as a free creation cannot be a necessary unfolding of God, nor an 
emanation of his being from divine fullness. When he creates something that is not 
God but also not nothing, this must have its ground not in itself, but in God's will or 
pleasure. It is the realm in which God displays his glory.(46) 
 
 
The new creation is one where God will be ‘all in all’. The world becomes transfigured by 
the presence of God through the participation of creation in God’s infinite creativity.(47) 
This echoes the Eastern Orthodox concept of participation of creation in the energeia of 
God.(48) Karl Rahner, similarly, insists that it is God’s intention to give creation a 
supernatural end, which has an effect on the essence of being itself.(49) For Rahner, the 
natural knowledge of God as perceived in creation is not sharply distinguished from the 
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revelation of God. However, the Christological dimension in Rahner's thought qualifies the 
theme of the future glory of creation. Moltmann, similarly, insists that the cross of Christ 
reminds us that the future of creation is not utopia on earth. 
 
Given this theological perspective which stresses the love of God and the future glory of all 
creation, how does this affect environmental ethics? First the cross of Christ reminds us 
both of the reality of the suffering of creation and of the very real temptation for humans to 
sin in identifying their enterprise with absolute value. Genetic engineering can never 
achieve utopia on earth, especially when blind to its use as an instrument in suffering. 
Moreover, God's love for all creation demands a respect for the interests of all creatures, 
whether they are produced by breeding methods or genetic engineering. This applies, as 
well, in making policy decisions as to the direction of research. Human beings, as made in 
the image of God, share in the creativity of the Creator. The Creator’s intention is towards 
future glorification. Hence, the human motivation to develop new varieties and transgenic 
species needs to come under careful scrutiny. The possibility of dishonesty in the use of 
environmental language to cover up consumerist interests has to be exposed. Here 
environmental ethics overlaps with business ethics and social conduct. 
 
The latter raises questions about human justice. For some years questions to do with the 
environment were considered in a way that was detached from development issues.(50) 
Development workers tended to despise environmentalists as those who seemed to pay 
more attention to the survival of animals, rather than people. More recently, there has 
been a greater appreciation of the interrelationship between environmental problems and 
development issues. It seems to me that this linkage is of special relevance to the 
particular questions surrounding genetic engineering, as highlighted in the case studies 
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given above. A Christian theological perspective would insist on examining the long-term 
consequences to poorer nations and communities.(51) It is this broader view which it is 
essential to keep in mind when dealing with decisions about the validity of particular 
genetic engineering projects. The wider global environmental impact also has to become 
part of the consideration by those given the power to implement policies. Hence it is both a 
question of what is good for humanity as well as what is good for the whole natural world. 
In this way the wider human and cosmic contexts act as points of reference.(52) 
 
A theological critique requires a radical change of attitude in formulating the goals of 
genetic engineering from one based on consumerism and the individual pursuit of 
happiness to a more community based view which includes respect for the whole 
environment. This respect is understood in terms of knowledge of the Creator who created 
the world out of nothing. Some theologians have attached the idea of respect for the 
environment to the concept of Gaia. The scientific hypothesis of James Lovelock 
encourages us to understand the planet as a living system. It has echoes in the ancient 
mythology of Gaia, the Earth Goddess. As I have argued elsewhere, basing an 
environmental philosophy on Lovelock’s Gaia hypothesis has its own particular pitfalls 
scientifically, theologically and ethically.(53) 
 
For some theologians even the idea of genetic engineering represents an unacceptable 
expression of human power and domination over creation. Linzey, for example, believes 
that ‘Genetic engineering represents the concretization of the absolute claim that animals 
belong to and exist for us ... they become totally and completely human property’.(54) He 
describes genetic engineering as a form of animal slavery. The idea that animals and 
plants are made simply for human use has its roots in the teaching of Aristotle.(55) A 
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similar view is echoed by Aquinas who insisted that non-human creation was for the 
benefit of humans.(56) He distinguishes between the general care of animals and love and 
fellowship amongst the human community.(57) The idea of cosmic fellowship and 
friendship with the whole creation has become a popular motif amongst contemporary 
theologians concerned with the environment.(58) While I would argue against Aquinas’s 
notion that all creation exists purely for human benefit, there seems to be some validity in 
the idea of distinguishing the love among humans from the love of humans for the cosmic 
community. If we deny that there are any distinctions we end up with a total moratorium on 
all genetic engineering, and probably many forms of traditional agriculture.(59) 
 
It would be inappropriate to lay the blame for the abuse of genetic engineering on only the 
scientists involved. We are all implicated in the social web of which scientists are a part. In 
seeking for a change in attitude amongst those more directly involved, a wider metanoia is 
needed which incorporates a sensitivity to creation in every aspect of our lives. This 
metanoia includes an attitude of humility and respect for all members of the human 
community. The very survival of the natural world requires sacrificial effort on our part. In 
the words of the Ecumenical Patriarchate: 
 
This is a new situation, a new challenge. It calls for humanity to bear some of the 
pain of creation as well as to enjoy and celebrate it. It calls first and foremost for 
repentance, but of an order not previously understood by many.(60) 
 
 
If we love creation we begin, then, to see the ‘divine mystery in things’. This awareness of 
the sacred in creation can become the lens through which we seek out what our 
responsibilities are in caring for the earth. The most common mind-set amongst genetic 
engineers is to fix on a particular problem or goal and to find ways of attaining this goal. A 
theological approach encourages those involved to see the wider social and religious 
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consequences of these decisions. It does not necessarily ban all genetic engineering, but 
seeks to transform it so that it more clearly represents a fully human enterprise. 
 
Philip Sherrard's book Human Image: World Image is important in its reinstatement of the 
idea of creation as sacred.(61) However, he is far too harsh in his treatment of modern 
science and scientists. He believes that any attempt to interfere with or remodel creation 
amounts to ‘sheer folly’, treating scientists as scapegoats, especially the mathematicians. 
Such a move is not particularly helpful. It seems to me that understanding the world as in 
some sense sacred is compatible with modern science as long as it seeks ethical ways 
forward. A complete retreat from science is a refusal to face the realities of this world of 
which we are part. Sherrard’s rejection of all dualistic thinking, which he describes as a 
‘form of depravity’ seems to extend to his understanding of the relationship between God 
and the world. As we might expect, he rejects the concept of the creation of the world out 
of nothing, and in so doing he blurs the distinction between God and creation. 
 
The ethical consequences of a fully fledged antidualism are somewhat disturbing. 
Szerszynski has summed up the arguments against antidualism.(62) One of his most 
important insights is that a refusal to distinguish adequately between ourselves and 
creation leads to an identification with the earth, which leads to a form of narcissism. For 
Matthew Fox and others, sin becomes treating others as separate from ourselves.(63) 
Instead of a genuinely relational ethic we arrive at an incorporation of the other into 
ourselves. Szerszynski points to the increasing tendency to turn to the non-European 
traditions for a saving role in ecology ‘as if they were the repressed contents of the 
European unconscious’. However, there seems to be no link between cosmologies and 
potential damage to the natural environment.(64) Szerszynski also argues that the idea of 
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environmental concern is bound up with an objectification of non-human creation as other 
than ourselves. John Milbank argues that the objectification of nature is still part of much 
‘green’ theology, so that any attempt to re-sacralize nature is misplaced.(65) However, it 
all depends on what we mean by the sacred in nature. A true understanding of the sacred 
respects the difference in the other. It seems to me that we can affirm the idea of the 
sacred without rejecting all distinctions. Like the Celtic saints, a keen awareness of the 
transcendence of God is matched by an appreciation of God's immanence in creation.(66) 
 
Hans Küng’s Global Responsibility is a brave attempt to locate world religions in the field 
of ethics.(67) However, his suggestion that a single world ethic can emerge from many 
different religious perspectives seems to me to be misplaced. It would tend to deny the 
distinctive contribution of each culture. There is also disappointingly little reference in his 
work to the global problems of ecology.(68) While the dialogue between different faiths is 
important in contributing to the practical task of policy making in genetic engineering, each 
faith needs to become aware of its own distinctive contribution. A lowest common 
denominator approach is unlikely to yield the promised fruit and more likely to raise false 
hopes. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The revolutionary changes taking place within biological science, in particular genetic 
engineering, has encouraged a mixed sense of awe and threat. Lewontin has suggested 
that the power of DNA technology is such as to give biology the status of ‘ideology’.(69) I 
have argued in this paper that it is the application of genetic engineering in biotechnology 
that raises significant philosophical, ethical and theological questions. The awe at the 
dawn of the new technology is tempered by the knowledge of the potential of 
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biotechnology to be abused as a means of power and domination. While on the one hand 
the technology promises solutions to immediate technological and scientific problems, on 
the other hand the indirect effects of such technology can easily be overlooked by policy 
makers interested only in immediate short-term damage limitation. A philosophical 
perspective can offer a more holistic approach. However, the language used by 
philosophers can be out of touch with modern developments in biology. Various myths 
such as the goodness of ‘wild nature’ or its ‘integrity’ abound. A real transformation of 
genetic engineering which would allow it to become a more fully humane enterprise is 
rarely discussed. A theological approach offers a spiritual dimension to the discussion and 
asks, in particular, how these changes impinge on those who are part of the Christian 
story. It challenges the injustices raised in the human community as well as the more 
indirect damage to the natural environment. However, if theology concentrates on the idea 
of the sacred in ‘nature’ to the exclusion of the transcendence of God, we reach an 
impasse. It seems that science and genetic engineering per se become impossible. 
Furthermore, it encourages an unrealistic retreat into the spiritual sphere, which is out of 
touch with modern biology and science. This is the very opposite of the claim to be 
‘holistic’. It seems to me that a more traditional understanding of God as transcendent yet 
immanent in creation provides a way through the current vogue of ‘naturalism’ into a more 
realistic and fruitful dialogue with science. 
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